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ABSTRACT 
Database outsourcing is a challenging task concerning data 
secrecy. Even if an adversary, including the service provider, 
accesses the data, she should not be able to learn any information 
from the accessed data. In this paper we address this problem for 
graph-structured data. First, we define a secrecy notion for graph-
structured data based on the concept of indistinguishability. The 
notion ensures that an adversary can learn the edges existing 
between the nodes only with negligible probability. To address 
this problem, we propose an approach based on bucketization. 
Next to bucketization, it makes use of obfuscated indexes and 
encryption. We show that finding an optimal bucketization 
tailored to graph-structured data is NP-hard; therefore we come up 
with a heuristic. We prove that the proposed bucketization 
approach fulfills our secrecy notion. In addition, we present a 
performance model which consists of (1) a number of buckets 
model that estimates the number of buckets obtained after 
applying our bucketization approach and (2) a query-cost model. 
Finally, we demonstrate with a set of experiments (1) the accuracy 
of our number of buckets model for scale-free networks and (2) 
the efficiency of our approach with respect to query processing. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Outsourcing databases to a third-party service provider has 
become ubiquitous. While economic and organizational 
advantages are obvious, database outsourcing remains challenging 
concerning data secrecy. Databases contain sensitive information 
that needs to be protected against adversaries, including the 
service provider. If an unauthorized user accesses the data, she 
should not be able to learn anything.  
A broad range of real-world datasets exhibits a graph structure. 
Furthermore, many real graphs such as the email network or the 
World Wide Web follow a scale-free power-law distribution [3]. 
At the same time, these graphs often contain sensitive information.  
In addition to the information attached to nodes, information is 
also attached to edges. In general, a node can be identified by its 
label as well as by its degree (number of edges). Therefore, 
approaches for secure storage of graph-structured data should 
protect against leaking this kind of information. Only encrypting 
node labels is not enough. Next, there have to be secrecy 
guarantees that are provable. At the same, the approaches should 
not do away with the advantages of database outsourcing, and 
query processing in particular should take place on the server as 
much as possible. While we are not aware of any previous work 
on secure storage featuring a cost model for query processing, this 
actually is important, to (1) have a good understanding of the 
expected performance of query processing, (2) facilitate 
comparisons between alternatives and (3) predict the impact of 
parameter changes. 
So there are two requirements on a secure storage scheme for 
graph-structured data. R1: An adversary, including the service 
provider, must not be able to learn the label of nodes or their 
degree. This must be provable (i.e., secrecy). R2: The approach 
should support a broad range of queries. It should do so 
efficiently, with controlled effort. To quantify this, a performance 
model is needed.  
The first requirement calls for a rigid definition of secrecy. This 
includes specifying the assumed knowledge of the adversary and 
the security property, i.e., a description of what constitutes a 
breach of the scheme. We consider adversaries with knowledge of 
(i) the algorithm used to secretize the graph 𝐺, (ii) the labels of all 
the nodes in 𝐺 and (iii) the multiset that contains the degree of 
each node in 𝐺, without stating the correspondence between nodes 
and degrees. The secrecy property ensures that, given a secretized 
graph, an adversary cannot say with non-negligible probability if 
the secretized graph corresponds to the original graph 𝐺. 
Since existing secrecy notions are different from this, we propose 
a new one, i.e., formalize the notion just sketched. Related secrecy 
notions deal with different types of adversaries. Notions such as 
[7], [23] offer guarantees against chosen plaintext attacks. In our 
scenario, these guarantees are not enough. This is because the 
edges of the graph can also reveal information. Wang et al. [22] 
define a secrecy notion for XML documents. It is based on the 
definition of perfect secrecy. As an XML document has a tree 
structure, they assume that an adversary knows the domain values 
of the data and the distribution on the leaf nodes. We additionally 
assume that the adversary knows the degree distribution of the 
complete graph 𝐺. 
Secure database storage has been widely studied. However, exist-
ing techniques such as [19], [1] either cannot be applied to graph-
structured data, or they do not cover both requirements R1 and 
R2. Approaches for graph-structured data such as [19], [18] do not 
keep the structure of the graph. Then they cannot answer certain 
queries, such as neighbor and adjacency queries. Other 
approaches like [1], [10], [2] could exhibit unwanted behavior 
when being adapted to graph-structured data, e.g., leak 
information, see Section 2. Next, none of these approaches 
features a model of the costs of query processing that considers 
relevant characteristics of the graph.  
We propose a bucketization approach for secure storage of graph-
structured data that meets our requirements. It has turned out that 
subtle design decisions have a significant impact. For example, it 
makes a big difference regarding secrecy whether we partition 
nodes into buckets instead of edges. This is because partitioning 
nodes could leak information on the graph structure, as we will 
explain. While our approach works for all types of graph queries 
in principle, we focus on neighbor and adjacency queries. These 
queries are essential information needs regarding graphs [17]. 
Then in what follows we describe the specifics, such as division 
of work between client and server, for these queries. 
Summing up, our contributions are as follows: First, we propose a 
secrecy notion for graph-structured data based on indistinguish-
ability [13]. Second, after showing that existing design alterna-
tives do not cope with all requirements, given that notion, we 
propose a solution featuring bucketization for graph-structured 
data. Our approach partitions edges into buckets. In order to 
answer queries, we store index information. It contains, next to 
other information, the labels of the nodes. We show that finding 
an optimal bucketization is NP-hard. Consequently, we propose a 
heuristic, which we also evaluate empirically later, with positive 
results. Third, we prove that our bucketization scheme fulfills our 
secrecy notion. Fourth, we come up with a performance model for 
query processing on graphs that are scale-free. Our performance 
model consists of (1) a number-of-buckets model, which estimates 
the number of buckets obtained after applying our bucketization 
approach and (2) a query-cost model. Finally, we conduct sys-
tematic experiments both on synthetic and on real datasets. They 
validate the accuracy of our estimation model and demonstrate the 
efficiency of the proposed bucketization technique. 
2. RELATED WORK  
In this section, we first review existing secrecy notions. Then we 
analyze work on bucketization for relational databases and on 
secure storage of graph-structured data. We omit related work that 
we have already discussed in the introduction.  
Secrecy notions: Adaptive semantic secrecy is proposed in [6] and 
[5]. This concept is adapted for answering approximate shortest 
distance queries in graphs in [18]. Their notion uses leakage 
functions, i.e., information revealed to the server. These 
approaches assume that the adversaries only have access to 
information that has leaked, but not to any other sources. We 
consider adversaries with additional information on the original 
graph 𝐺, i.e., the labels of all nodes of 𝐺 and the multiset that 
contains the degree of each node in 𝐺.  
Bucketization on relational databases: Data secrecy in relational 
databases has been investigated extensively [10], [2], [9]. Several 
approaches are based on bucketization. In this context, bucketiza-
tion (1) encrypts each tuple in an original relation as one string, 
(2) groups the tuples in partitions, each partition represents a 
bucket, and (3) stores index values. Each index value is related to 
a partition of the domain of an original attribute. The server stores 
the secretized relation and the index information. In what follows, 
we sketch two adaptations of these approaches to graphs and show 
that these alternatives are not appropriate to solve our problem.   
With both adaptations, we represent the edges in a two-attribute 
relation, 𝑇𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠, where each attribute stores one node of the edge. 
Borrowing from bucketization schemes for relational databases, 
two alternatives come to mind, one-dimensional bucketization and 
multidimensional bucketization. 
- One dimensional bucketization. Here, the domains of the two 
attributes in TEdges are considered as one domain and then 
divided into partitions. This solution cannot be considered 
secure because it could exhibit some of the original graph 
structure, see Example 2.1. 
Example 2.1: Consider a graph with edges E={(A,B), (B,C), 
(C,A)}. If bucketization assigns Nodes A, B and C to different 
buckets, the connections between the buckets will share the 
same structure as the original graph. Table 2.1 shows the 
secretized relation. The partitions are 
[𝑏1, {𝐴}], [𝑏2, {𝐵}], [𝑏3, {𝐶}]. The relationship between the 
index values (b1,b2), (b2,b3) and (b3,b1) share the same 
structure as the original edges E. 
 
Table 2.1. Secretized relation of Example 2.1 
e-tuple Node_1 Node_2 
𝑒𝑛𝑐(𝐴, 𝐵) b1 b2 
𝑒𝑛𝑐(𝐵, 𝐶) b2 b3 
𝑒𝑛𝑐(𝐶, 𝐴) b3 b1 
 
- Multidimensional bucketization. With this option, the domain 
of each attribute is partitioned individually. Given an optimal 
multidimensional bucketization, this bucketization can be 
secure. However, the effort of finding an optimal 
multidimensional bucketization with respect to query 
performance is NP-hard [15]. Nevertheless, this NP-hard 
problem can be solved with heuristics such as in [15] and [21]. 
But, these solutions do not consider certain graphs 
characteristics such as the distribution of edges per node or 
grouping edges of a node in the same partition to answer 
important graph queries such as neighbor queries efficiently. 
So these approaches do not solve our problem. 
Secure storage for graph-structured data: An approach for 
finding the shortest path between two nodes in a directed graph is 
presented in [12]. Random perturbation of the edges is required in 
order to offer edge privacy. The perturbation modifies the 
structure of the graph to some extent. Therefore, queries results 
can only be approximate. As XML documents are a specific kind 
of graph, we briefly turn to this research direction as well. The 
approaches in [22] and [4] require the existence of a domain 
hierarchy, such as parent-child, in order to create blocks or 
vectors, respectively. In graph-structured data, such a hierarchy 
typically does not exist. 
To summarize, none of the related approaches we are aware of 
does address Requirements R1and R2. 
3. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION 
We now present some notation that we will use in the paper.  
Definition 3.1: A graph 𝐺 is a tuple (𝑉, 𝐸), where 𝑉 is a finite set 
of nodes and 𝐸 ⊆ 𝑉 × 𝑉 is a relation between nodes. |𝑉| is the 
number of nodes, |𝐸| the one of edges existing in 𝐺, and 𝒢 is the 
set of all graphs. 
For a given graph 𝐺, 𝑉(𝐺) = 𝑉 and 𝐸(𝐺) = 𝐸. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that the relationships between the nodes are 
directed. This means that (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸 does not imply (𝑣, 𝑢) ∈ 𝐸. 
An undirected edge can be represented by two directed edges.  
Definition 3.2: Given a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸)   and a node 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉, the 
degree of u, 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢), is the number of outgoing edges of node 𝑢.  
Definition 3.3: A Neighbor Query 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) of a graph 
𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) and a node 𝑢 ∈ 𝐸 returns the set of all nodes adjacent 
to 𝑢 in 𝐺: 𝑄Neigbhor(𝐺, 𝑢) = {𝑣 ∈ 𝑉|(𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸}. 
Definition 3.4: An Adjacency Query 𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣) of a 
graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸)  and a pair of nodes 𝑢, 𝑣, checks whether node 
𝑢 is adjacent to node 𝑣: 𝑄Adjacency(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣)  = true iff (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸. 
Definition 3.5: A deterministic encryption scheme 𝛦𝑑 =
(𝑘𝑔𝑒𝑛, 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝐾 , 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑑
𝐾) applied to a plaintext 𝑚 consists of three 
parts: (1) a key generation algorithm 𝑘𝑔𝑒𝑛 that returns a 
cryptographic key 𝐾; (2) a deterministic encryption 
algorithm 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝐾 that takes the cryptographic key 𝐾 and the 
plaintext 𝑚 to compute a ciphertext 𝑐𝑖 in the 𝑖-th run of the 
algorithm, such that, if 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑 runs 𝑛 times, 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑗 for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈
{1, … . , 𝑛}, and (3) a deterministic decryption algorithm 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑑
𝐾  that 
takes the cryptographic key 𝐾 and the ciphertext  𝑐𝑖 to revert the 
deterministic encryption, such that 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑑
𝐾 (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝐾(𝑚)) = 𝑚 for all 
encryption runs. 
Definition 3.6: A probabilistic encryption scheme 𝛦𝑝 =
(𝑘𝑔𝑒𝑛, 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝
𝐾 , 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝐾) applied to a plaintext 𝑚 consists of three 
parts: (1) a key generation algorithm 𝑘𝑔𝑒𝑛 that returns a crypto-
graphic key 𝐾, (2) a probabilistic encryption algorithm 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝
𝐾 that 
takes the cryptographic key 𝐾 and the plaintext 𝑚 to compute a 
ciphertext 𝑐𝑖 in the 𝑖-th run of the algorithm, such that, if 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝 
runs 𝑛 times, 𝑐𝑖 ≠ 𝑐𝑗  for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … . , 𝑛}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, and (3) a 
probabilistic decryption algorithm 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝐾  that takes the 
cryptographic key 𝐾 and the ciphertext 𝑐𝑖 to revert the 
deterministic encryption, such that 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝐾 (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝
𝐾(𝑚)) = 𝑚 for all 
encryption runs. 
Definition 3.7: Given a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), the multiset of degrees 
𝑁𝐸 is the multiset that contains the degree of each node 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉. 
4. THE SECRECY MODEL 
In this section, we describe the prior knowledge of the adversary 
and the secrecy notion we target at.  
4.1 The adversary knowledge 
Let  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑(𝐺) denote the transformed graph after the 
graph transformation function has been applied to the graph 𝐺. 
We assume an adversary with the following knowledge: 
K1: The adversary 𝒜 has access to the transformed graph, 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑(𝐺). The adversary also knows the algorithm 
used to transform the graph. 
K2: 𝒜 knows the labels of all nodes in 𝐺.  
K3: 𝒜 knows 𝑁𝐸, but she does not know which degree of the 
multiset corresponds to which node. 
Knowledge K1 is based on Kerckhoffs’ principle, and it is a 
standard assumption from cryptology. Knowledge K2 and K3 
describe realistic assumptions on external knowledge that the 
adversary could have. In what follows, when we refer to an 
adversary 𝒜, we assume that 𝒜 to not have any knowledge 
beyond K1, K2 and K3. 
4.2 Our secrecy notion  
We propose a secrecy notion for graph-structured data called 
Indistinguishability under Independent Node Permutation, Ind-
INP. Our secrecy notion is based on the concept of 
indisinguishability presented in [13]. [13] has proven that this 
concept is equivalent to the standard semantic secrecy, i.e., an 
adversary is not able to learn any partial information on the 
plaintext of a given ciphertext. The reason why we use the 
concept of indistinguishability as our secrecy notion is the one 
featured in [13]: Having an algorithm, it is easier to show that it 
fulfills indistinguishability than the concept of semantic secrecy. 
However, the secrecy guarantees are the same.  
Definition 4.1: A graph transformation function 𝑓: 𝒢 → 𝒢 is a 
function that transforms a graph 𝐺 to another graph 𝐺′. The set of 
all graph transformation functions is ℱ. 
Conventional examples of graph transformation functions are 
addition of edges or deletion of nodes. 
Let 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) be the original graph-structured data and 𝐺’ =
(𝑉, 𝐸′) be another graph with the same nodes as 𝐺, but with 
different edges 𝐸’. Permuting the nodes of the original graph 𝐺 
perturbs the edges and yields 𝐸’. Node permutation is also a graph 
transformation function. It is defined as follows: 
Definition 4.2: An Independent Node Permutation function 𝔭 is 
a function 𝔭 ∈ ℱ where 𝑉(𝔭(𝐺)) = 𝑉(𝐺) for all graphs 𝐺 ∈ 𝒢 
and |𝐸(𝔭(𝐺))| = |𝐸(𝐺)|. 
Node permutation can be implemented as follows. Given a 
graph G, replace each node 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 with a random node 𝑥 ∈ 𝑉. The 
identity function is a valid node permutation. 
Let 𝒜 be an adversary, 𝜏 a graph transformation function and 𝔭 an 
independent node permutation. Figure 4.1 features the experiment 
needed to define the secrecy notion Ind-INP. 𝐺0 is the trans-
formed graph of 𝐺, and 𝐺1 is the transformed graph of the 
permuted graph 𝔭(𝐺). A random bit 𝑏 ∈ {0,1} is chosen. The 
transformed graph 𝐺𝑏 is given to the adversary 𝒜.  𝒜 does not 
know whether 𝜏 has had 𝐺 or 𝔭(𝐺) as input. The challenge of the 
adversary is to “guess” which one of the two graphs 𝐺0 or 𝐺1 has 
been the input of the transformation. 𝒜 outputs a bit ?̅?. The output 
of the experiment is defined to be 1 if 𝑏 = ?̅?, and 0 otherwise. If 
𝐼𝑛𝑑 − 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝒜,𝜏 (𝐺) = 1, we say that 𝒜 has succeeded.  
 
 
Definition 4.3: A graph transformation 𝝉 is called Ind-INP 
secure if the function 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝒜
𝜏 (𝐺) ≔ |𝑃𝑟[Ind-INP𝒜,𝜏(𝐺) = 1] −
1
2
| 
is negligible for any adversary 𝒜 with knowledge K1, K2, and K3 
whose computational effort is bounded to run in polynomial time. 
Definition 4.4: A function 𝒇 is negligible 𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∀𝑐 ∈ ℕ ∃𝑛𝑜 ∈ ℕ 
such that for 𝑛 ≥ 𝑛0, 𝑓(𝑛) < 𝑛
−𝑐. 
Although indistinguishability offers guarantees equivalent to 
semantic secrecy, it is not intuitive what this secrecy notion 
guarantees. Therefore, we describe a property of our secrecy 
definition Ind-INP, which will help users understanding the 
secrecy guarantees offered by our secrecy notion. It will be 
Theorem 4.1 that actually introduces this property, and before 
introducing it, some notation and definitions are needed. The 
following explains the probability of guessing the degree of a 
node in 𝐺, 𝑃𝒜, by an adversary 𝒜. Next to other things, 𝒜 knows 
the set of nodes 𝑁 and the multiset of degrees 𝑁𝐸. Calculating 𝑃𝒜 
requires the identification of all possible permutations of the 
elements of 𝑁𝐸.  
Figure 4.1. The experiment 𝐈𝐧𝐝 − 𝐈𝐍𝐏𝓐,𝓣(𝐆)  
 
Definition 4.5: Given a multiset of degrees 𝑁𝐸 of a graph 𝐺, the 
frequency of an element 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 is the number of times the 
element 𝑖 occurs in 𝑁𝐸. The set of the frequencies of the different 
elements in  𝑁𝐸 is 𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ = ⋃ 𝑑𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 , where 𝑑𝑖 is the frequency of 
element 𝑖 and 𝑘 is the number of different elements in  𝑁𝐸1. 
Lemma 4.1. Given a multiset of degrees 𝑁𝐸 of a graph 𝐺, the 
number of different permutations of the elements of the multiset 
 𝑁𝐸 ,  𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸) is given by the function 
𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸) =
|𝑁𝐸|!
∏ 𝑑𝑖!𝑑𝑖∈𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
   (4.1) 
PROOF: Let 𝑘 be the number of different elements in the multiset 
 𝑁𝐸 and 𝑑𝑖, the frequency of element 𝑖, where 𝑖 ∈ {1,⋯, 𝑘}. There 
are (
|𝑁𝐸|
𝑑1
) ways to place the first different element, (
|𝑁𝐸| − 𝑑1
𝑑2
) 
ways to place the second different element, and so on. Then the 
total number of different permutations 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸) is  
𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸) =
|𝑁𝐸|!
𝑑1!∙(|𝑁𝐸|−𝑑1)!
∙
(|𝑁𝐸|−𝑑1)!
𝑑2!∙(|𝑁𝐸|−𝑑1−𝑑2)!
∙ ⋯ ∙
(|𝑁𝐸|−𝑑1−⋯−𝑑𝑘−1)!
𝑑𝑘!
  
=
|𝑁𝐸|!
∏ 𝑑𝑖!𝑑𝑖∈𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
  ∎ 
Lemma 4.2. An adversary 𝒜 can guess the degree of a node in a 
graph 𝐺 with probability 𝑃𝒜 = (
1
𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸)
). 
PROOF: From Lemma 4.1, we know the number of all possible 
permutations of elements of the multiset 𝑁𝐸. The probability of 
identifying the degree of the nodes is 1 divided by the number of 
permutations 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸). ∎ 
We now introduce Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4, which will help us to 
prove Theorem 4.1 subsequently. 
Lemma 4.3. Given a multiset of degrees 𝑁𝐸 of a graph 𝐺, 
|𝑁𝐸|!
(|𝑁𝐸|−|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ |+1)!
 is a lower bound of the function 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸). 
PROOF: Consider the denominator of the function  𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸), 
∏ 𝑑𝑖!𝑑𝑖∈𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ = (1 × ⋯ × 𝑑1)(1 × ⋯ × 𝑑2) ⋯ (1 × ⋯ × 𝑑|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ |)  
The number of factors 𝑟 different from 1 in ∏ 𝑑𝑖!𝑑𝑖∈𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ , is 
𝑟
(∏ 𝑑𝑖!𝑑𝑖∈𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
 )
= ∑ (𝑑𝑖 − 1) =
|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ |
𝑖=1
|𝑁𝐸| − |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | 
Consider now the term (|𝑁𝐸| − |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | + 1)! 
The number of factors 𝑟 different from 1 in (|𝑁𝐸| − |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | + 1)! is 
𝑟((|𝑁𝐸|−|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ |+1)!  ) = |𝑁𝐸| − |𝑁𝐸
̅̅ ̅̅ | 
Consequently, for each factor 𝑎 in ∏ 𝑑𝑖!𝑑𝑖∈𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ , there exists a factor 
𝑏 in (|𝑁𝐸| − |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | + 1)! such that 𝑏 ≥ 𝑎.  
Altogether  (|𝑁𝐸| − |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | + 1)! ≥ ∏ 𝑑𝑖!𝑑𝑖∈𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅  and 
|𝑁𝐸|!
(|𝑁𝐸|−|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ |+1)!
 is a 
lower bound of the function 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸). ∎ 
Lemma 4.4. The lower bound of the function 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸), 
|𝑁𝐸|!
(|𝑁𝐸|−|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ |+1)!
 grows asymptotically faster than any polynomial for 
|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | ≥ 𝑛0  if the condition 𝑛0 =
|𝑁𝐸|
𝑐
  is fulfilled and  𝑐 ∈ ℝ>1. 
                                                                
1 We use 𝑑1 ∪ 𝑑2 as a short hand for {𝑑1} ∪ {𝑑2}. 
PROOF: Without loss of generality we set |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | =
|𝑁𝐸|
𝑐
 for 𝑐 ∈ ℝ>1. 
Next, we consider the function 𝑔(𝑥) =
𝑥!
(𝑥−
𝑥
𝑐
+1)!
. 𝑔(𝑥) behaves 
like the term 𝐴 =
|𝑁𝐸|!
(|𝑁𝐸|−
|𝑁𝐸|
𝑐
+1)!
  with respect to |𝑁𝐸|  as the 
argument of the function. Now we analyze the limits of the 
denominator of the function 𝑔(𝑥): lim𝑥→∞ 𝑥 −
𝑥
𝑐
+ 1 = 1 
Then 
|𝑁𝐸|!
(|𝑁𝐸|−
|𝑁𝐸|
𝑐
+1)!
tends to |𝑁𝐸|!  Consequently 𝐴 grows faster 
than any polynomial for |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | ≥
|𝑁𝐸|
𝑐
. ∎ 
Lemma 4.4 says that for any polynomial 𝑝(𝑁𝐸) there exists a 
𝑛0 such that 
|𝑁𝐸|!
(|𝑁𝐸|−|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ |+1)!
≥ 𝑝(𝑁𝐸) for all |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | ≥ 𝑛0. In the 
following we give some examples to illustrate how this 𝑛𝑜 looks 
like. Figure 4.2shows 𝑛0 for the functions 𝑝(𝑁𝐸) = |𝑁𝐸|
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and 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸). We have conducted experiments with different 
polynomial functions, and we have always found a 𝑛0 for which 
Lemma 4.4 holds.  
 
 
Theorem 4.1. If a graph transformation 𝜏 fulfills Definition 4.3, 
the probability 𝑃𝒜 that an adversary learns the degree of a node 
in the graph given K1, K2 and K3 is negligible for  |𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | ≥
|𝑁𝐸|
𝑐
, 
where 𝑐 ∈ ℝ>1. 
PROOF: 𝑃𝒜 is the inverse of the function 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸) (Lemma 4.1). 
From Lemma 4.2, we know that the lower bound of the function 
𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝐸) grows asymptotically faster than any polynomial for any 
|𝑁𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ | >
|𝑁𝐸|
𝑐
. Therefore, its inverse decreases faster than any 
polynomial. Then 𝑃𝒜 is negligible. ∎ 
5. OUR SECRECY APPROACH 
In this section, we describe our bucketization approach for graphs. 
We first give an overview and describe the underlying system 
architecture. Then we describe the challenges, formalize the 
problem and present our approach. 
5.1 Overview and System Architecture 
We consider a database-as-a-service setting where a third-party 
service provider stores the data owned by the clients. Clients 
apply techniques to secretize the data before passing it to the 
service provider, in order to maintain data secrecy. 
Definition 5.1: Given a graph 𝐺, a bucket 𝑏 is a finite set of edges 
of 𝐺. Each bucket has a 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷 denoted by 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷(𝑏). 
There is a maximum capacity of any bucket, denoted by 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠. The set of buckets of graph 𝐺 is denoted by 𝑆𝐵. 
Definition 5.2: Given a graph 𝐺 and its corresponding set of 
buckets 𝑆𝐵, the index information is a map of type 𝑚: 𝑉 → 𝑆𝐵 
Figure 4.2. Functions 𝒑(𝑵𝑬) and 𝑷𝒆𝒓(𝑵𝑬)  
 
that, for each node 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉, contains the set of 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠 of 
buckets that store at least one outgoing edge of 𝑢. 
Definition 5.3: A bucketization structure B of a given graph 𝐺 is 
a representation of 𝐺 consisting of two parts, (1) a set of buckets 
𝑆𝐵 and (2) the index information. We call the set of all possible 
bucketization structures Bucketizations. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates a bucketization structure.  
Definition 5.4: A bucketization function 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘: 𝒢 →
𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 is a function that generates a bucketization 
structure 𝐵 for a graph 𝐺. 
Section 5.5 will present the bucketization functions which we use. 
Definition 5.5: Given bucketization structure 𝐵, an encryption 
function 𝑒𝑛𝑐: 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 → 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 performs the 
actual encryption of 𝐵 as follows: (1) In the index information, 
each label of a node is encrypted deterministically, and the 
𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠 are encrypted probabilistically. (2) In the buckets, 
each edge is encrypted deterministically. 
Before outsourcing a graph 𝐺, the client applies a bucketization 
function on 𝐺. After encryption the bucketization structure is 
outsourced to the service provider. Figure 5.1 shows this process. 
 
 
 
Query evaluation in the outsourced bucketization structure 
requires translating client-side queries to corresponding server-
side queries. We assume that there are two components for query 
processing at the client side: (1) the query translator and (2) the 
query postprocessor, see Figure 5.2. The query translator 
translates the queries supported to server-side queries, the 
translation process is explained in Section 5.6. The server-side 
queries are sent to the server. The query post-processor is in 
charge of (1) receiving the encrypted results of the server-side 
query from the server, (2) unencrypting the results and (3) 
filtering any false positive, by applying the original client-side 
query. The final result is sent to the user.  
5.2 Bucketization – Challenges 
Even though using an encryption function solves the problem of 
chosen-plaintext attacks, this does not yield secrecy guarantees 
against frequency attacks. We for our part use bucketization to 
solve this problem. However, this is challenging in order to 
facilitate both good query performance as well as data secrecy. 
This is because it is not obvious how to assign edges to buckets, 
see Examples 5.1 and 5.2. 
Definition 5.6: The frequency of a bucket is the number of edges 
that the bucket stores. 
Example 5.1: Consider an email network with nodes V={Alice, 
Bob, Carol, Dan, Eva} and edges E={(Alice, Bob), (Alice, Dan), 
(Alice, Carol), (Alice, Eva), (Bob, Dan), (Carol, Eva), (Carol, 
Alice), (Dan, Carol), (Eva, Bob)}. Assume that we apply a 
bucketization algorithm that assigns edges randomly and stores 2 
edges per bucket. In the worst case, the four edges of Alice are 
assigned to four different buckets. This means that it is necessary 
to access four buckets to retrieve Alice’s edges. Then the overall 
query processing effort and the client workload are rather large, 
i.e., the client has to filter more data.  
Example 5.2: Consider the email network from Example 5.1. If 
each bucket stores all the edges belonging to only one node and 
no other edges, the frequency of each bucket reveals the node 
degree. If an adversary knows that Alice is the user that has sent 
more emails than any other user, followed by Carol, the adversary 
can conclude that the bucket with four edges corresponds to Alice 
and the one with 3 edges to Carol. So the adversary has learned 
the actual degree of Alice and Carol. Moreover the adversary can 
learn that Alice has sent an email to Carol. 
So assigning edges to buckets randomly is likely to bog down 
query performance. The edges of a node should be stored in as 
few buckets as possible. At the same time, storing all edges of a 
node in one bucket creates a link between the degree of nodes and 
their corresponding buckets, which might affect secrecy. 
Although encryption offers some secrecy guarantees, they are not 
enough. To avoid information leakage, as illustrated in 
Example 5.2, buckets should be undistinguishable. We aim for an 
equal frequency of buckets, i.e., all buckets should reach their 
maximal capacity. Since a simple assignment may not always 
yield full buckets, it is promising to merge them a posteriori 
and/or add dummy edges; our approach will feature both. Of 
course, the total number of dummy edges should be as small as 
possible. Preliminary experiments of ours have shown that 
dummy edges do increase query-processing time significantly 
because the client must filter more false positives. 
We proceed now to formalize our bucketization problem. 
5.3 The Bucketization Problem  
The bucketization problem is as follows: 
Figure 5.1. Bucketization and Encryption on Graph 𝑮 
Figure 5.2. Query process 
 
Given as input a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) we search for a bucketization 
𝐵 that meets Constraints c1-c4: 
c1 Each edge (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸 is assigned to one bucket.  
c2 Each bucket stores at most 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 edges. 
c3 Edges adjacent to the same node are placed in as few 
buckets as possible. Formally, let the function 𝑖𝑛𝑑: 𝑉 ×
𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 → ℕ be as follows:  
 𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑢, 𝐵): = |{𝑏 ∈ 𝐵| ∃ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑉| (𝑢, 𝑥) ∈ 𝑏}|.  
Then ∀𝐵′ ∈ 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠: 𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑢, 𝐵) ≤ 𝑖𝑛𝑑((𝑢, 𝐵′) 
c4 The total number of buckets should be as small as possible 
(while prioritizing Constraint c3).  
We prioritize Constraint c3 over c4, so that query performance is 
not affected. 
Definition 5.7: An optimal bucketization is a bucketization that 
meets Constraints c1 to c4. 
In the next subsection we show that the problem of finding the 
bucketization defined by Constraints c1-c4 is NP-hard. 
5.4 Hardness Result 
Our bucketization problem is NP-hard. To prove this, we reduce 
the Bin-packing problem (BP problem) [20] to our problem. The 
BP problem has been proven to be NP-hard in [20]. We start by 
introducing the BP problem.  
Definition 5.8: Let a set of 𝑛 bins 𝐶 = {𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛} and the same 
number of 𝑛 items 𝐼 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛 } be given. All bins have 
equal capacity 𝑤𝑐 , and the weight of each  item 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑤𝑎𝑖, is 
smaller than or equal to the capacity 𝑤𝑐 . The Bin-packing 
problem is finding a function 𝐵𝑃: 𝐼 → 𝐶 that maps each item in 𝐼 
to one bin in 𝐶 such that the following Constraints bp1, bp2 and 
bp3 are met. 
bp1 An item is assigned to only one bin.  
bp2 The sum of the weight of all items assigned to a bin does not 
exceed the bin capacity 𝑤𝑐 . ∀𝑐𝑗 ∈ 𝐶: 𝑊𝑐𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝑐  where 
𝑊𝑐𝑗 = ∑ 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑖∈|{𝑎∈𝐼|𝐵𝑃(𝑎)=𝑐𝑗}|  . 
bp3 The number 𝑚 of bins used is as small as possible, i.e., 
 𝑚 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, |𝐵𝑃(𝑐𝑗)|)𝑐𝑗∈𝐶 . 
For the hardness proof, we introduce Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2. They 
help us (1) to show that an instance of the BP problem, called 
initial BP, can be reduced in polynomial time to an instance of the 
bucketization problem, called transformed BP, and (2) to prove 
that a given solution of the transformed BP can be transformed to 
a solution of the initial BP in polynomial time. 
We start by identifying the steps required to construct the 
transformed BP. 
Input construction process: Given a set of items 𝐼, the 
transformed BP is constructed as follows: 
- For each item 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, create the set of nodes 
𝑉𝑖={𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖1, 𝑎𝑖2,…, 𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑖 } and the set of edges 
𝐸𝑖={(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖1), (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖2),…, (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑖 )}.  
- The graph is (⋃ 𝑉𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , ⋃ 𝐸𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ). 
Lemma 5.1. Input transformation. Given an initial BP, the 
transformed BP can be constructed in polynomial time. 
PROOF: For each item 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, in order to build the transformed BP 
we need (𝑤𝑎𝑖 + 1) nodes and 𝑤𝑎𝑖 edges. Altogether this requires 
∑ (𝑤𝑎𝑖 + 1)
𝑛
𝑖=1  steps. However, ∑ (𝑤𝑎𝑖 + 1)
𝑛
𝑖=1  ≤ (𝑤𝑐 + 1) ∙ 𝑛 
and 𝑤𝑐  is a constant, so the construction is still polynomial. Then 
an initial BP can be transformed to a transformed BP in 
polynomial time.   ∎ 
Example 5.3 illustrates the construction of the transformed BP.  
Example 5.3: Consider the initial BP with set of items               
𝐼 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3,  𝑎4} with weights 𝑤𝑎1 = 3, 𝑤𝑎2 = 1,  𝑤𝑎3 = 2, 
𝑤𝑎4 = 4 and the set 𝐶 of bins with capacity 𝑤𝑐=5. Figure 5.3 
shows the transformed BP. 
Once we have built the transformed BP, we can run an algorithm 
that solves the bucketization problem, by setting 𝑤𝑐 to 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠. The solution of the transformed BP is a 
bucketization 𝐵. Figure 5.4.a shows the set of buckets 𝑆𝐵 of 
Example 5.3, 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are the 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠. Since we set 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 = 𝑤𝑐 , it holds for all buckets 𝑏 ∈ 𝑆𝐵 that |𝑏| ≤ 𝑤𝑐.  
The next lemma, Lemma 5.2, states that a solution of the initial 
BP can be constructed in polynomial time from a solution of the 
transformed BP. Before moving to Lemma 5.2, we first explain 
the solution construction process. 
 
 
Solution transformation process: A solution of the initial BP can 
be constructed from a solution of the transformed BP as follows: 
- Identify the number of bins 𝑚 needed to store the items. Each 
bucket represents one bin. Then 𝑚 = |𝑆𝐵|. 
- Identify the set of items that each bin will store. 
𝑐𝑖={𝑥|∃(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑏𝑖}. Figure 5.4.b shows the solution 
constructed for the initial BP of Example 5.3.  
Lemma 5.2. Output transformation. A solution of the 
transformed BP can be transformed to one of the initial BP in 
polynomial time. 
PROOF: Consider a bucketization of the transformed BP that 
fulfills Constraints c1-c4. We transform it to a BP solution with 
the solution construction process. Now we proceed to 
demonstrate that the transformed solution fulfills the constraints 
of the BP problem, bp1 to bp3 with respect to the initial BP 
problem. We start by analyzing the constraints of the BP problem 
and of the bucketization problem. 
Figure 5.3. Transformed BP of Example 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.4. Solution of Example 5.3 
𝑆𝐵 = {
{(𝑎1, 𝑎11), (𝑎1, 𝑎12), (𝑎1, 𝑎13), (𝑎3, 𝑎31), (𝑎3, 𝑎32)}𝑏1
{(𝑎2, 𝑎21), (𝑎4, 𝑎41), (𝑎4, 𝑎42), (𝑎4, 𝑎43), (𝑎4, 𝑎44)}𝑏2
} 
a) The set of buckets 𝑆𝐵 solution of the transformed BP 
 
b) The solution of the initial BP 
𝐶 = {𝑐1, 𝑐2, 𝑐3, 𝑐4}  𝑐1 = {𝑎1, 𝑎3} 
𝑚 = |𝑆𝐵| = 2   𝑐2 = {𝑎2, 𝑎4} 
 
First, Constraint bp1 is fulfilled because of Constraints c1 and c3 
of the bucketization problem. Constraint c1 ensures that each edge 
is assigned to only one bucket. Then ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑐𝑖 ∩ 𝑐𝑗 = ∅. 
Together with the fact that for all items 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑤𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠, 
Constraint c3 ensures that the edges belonging to the same node 
are placed in the same bucket.  
Second, Constraint bp2 is fulfilled because of Constraint c2 of the 
bucketization problem. For all bins 𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, |𝑐𝑖| = |𝑏𝑖| and 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 = 𝑤𝑐 , then |𝑏𝑖| ≤ 𝑤𝑐 , which fulfills bp1. 
Third, bp3 is fulfilled because of Constraint c4. The number of 
buckets is the number of bins used in the initial BP solution. Then 
minimizing the buckets is the same as minimizing the number of 
bins used. 
Finally, a bucketization solution of a transformed BP can be 
transformed to a solution of the initial BP in polynomial time. For 
all buckets 𝑏𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐵,  |𝑏𝑖| = |𝑐𝑖| and ∑ |𝑐𝑖| = ∑ 𝑤𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 . Then the 
complexity of the reconstruction is Ο(𝑚), where 𝑚 is the total 
number of edges and 𝑚=∑ 𝑤𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . ∎ 
Theorem 5.1. Finding an optimal bucketization that meets 
Constraints c1 - c4 is NP-hard. 
PROOF: With Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 we have shown that an instance 
of the BP problem can be reduced to an instance of the 
bucketization problem in polynomial time. Since the BP problem 
is NP-hard [20], the bucketization problem is NP-hard as well. ∎ 
In the next section we present our bucketization approach. 
5.5 The Bucketization Algorithm 
Due to the complexity of the problem, we use heuristics to find an 
approximate solution to an optimal bucketization. 
The bucketization algorithm consists of (1) partitioning the edges 
of a graph 𝐺 into buckets with the constraints established in 
Section 5.3 and (2) creating the corresponding index information. 
The algorithm has an initialization phase and a merging phase.  
5.5.1 The Initialization Phase  
Algorithm 1 is the initialization phase of our bucketization 
approach for a graph 𝐺. It starts by padding the labels of the nodes 
to ensure that all strings that represent an edge have the same 
length. Then the algorithm follows the next steps: (1) create the 
buckets needed to store the edges of 𝐺, (2) assign 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 
edges belonging to the same node to each bucket randomly and 
(3) generate the index information.  
We justify the need for padding in Section 5.7. Example 5.4 
illustrates how the assignment of edges works, and Example 5.5 
explains the need for randomness with this assignment.  
Example 5.4: We set 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 = 10. Given a node 𝑣 that has 
27 edges, three buckets will be created. 10 random edges are 
chosen from the 27 edges and are assigned to the first buckets, 10 
random edges are chosen from the remaining ones for the second 
bucket, and the 7 remaining edges go to the third bucket.  
Example 5.5: For the sake of an easy example, image a setting 
where emails can be revoked without difficulty. For this example, 
we consider the buckets in Figure 5.5. Assume that the 
bucketization algorithm does not assign edges randomly. If an 
adversary knows that user 𝐴 has sent 4 emails, learns that the 
system has revoked one of the emails and sees that Bucket b2 is 
deleted, although the edges are encrypted, she will learn that the 
revoked email was the last one, i.e., the email sent to user 𝐸. A 
random assignment of edges reduces the probability of the 
adversary learning extra information.  
 
Algorithm 1: Initialization() 
INPUT: Graph: 𝐺(𝑉, 𝐸), int: maxEdges  
OUTPUT: initial bucketization:  𝐵0 
1:  //Step 0: pad the length of all nodes 
2: pad.labelOfNodes();  
3:  //Step 1: create a sufficient number of buckets for each node  
4:  for each 𝑣 in 𝑉 {  
5:      create (ceil(1, v.numberOfEdges()/maxEdges)) buckets;  
6: //Step 2: assign edges of each node to a corresponding bucket 
7:      assign randomly up to maxEdges edges of 𝑣 to each bucket; 
8: generate the corresponding index information; 
9: } 
 
 
Definition 5.9: Given a graph 𝐺, the initial bucketization 𝐵0 is 
the result of the initialization phase of the bucketization algorithm 
applied to 𝐺.  
After the initialization phase of the bucketization process, all 
edges have been placed into their buckets. At this point, some 
buckets may not have reached their maximal capacity. Even if we 
encrypt the buckets at this stage, the initial bucketization is not 
secure. Recall that edges are encrypted individually. Then an 
adversary can learn the frequency of buckets. Furthermore, if the 
degree of a node is less than or equal to 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠, its edges 
have been placed in one bucket exclusively. An adversary could 
now gain extra knowledge by analyzing the initial bucketization, 
see Example 5.2.  
5.5.2 The Merging Phase  
Definition 5.10: Bucket merge is a process that puts the content 
of two buckets in a new one and then deletes the two emptied ones. 
In this phase, the algorithm merges buckets in order to fulfill 
Constraint c4. 
Definition 5.11: Given a graph 𝐺, a final bucketization 𝐵 is a 
bucketization resulting from the initialization and merging phases 
applied to 𝑮.  
Algorithm 2 identifies pairs of buckets that can be merged in 
order to obtain buckets with the same frequency, to address the 
secrecy issues from Section 5.5.1. Different heuristics are 
conceivable at this stage. We choose a First Fit Decreasing 
approach (FFD) [8]. We will justify this decision after having 
explained the algorithm. When the algorithm starts, Lines 1-3, it 
creates three sets: (1) 𝐵′, which contains buckets that do not yet 
have 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠; 𝐵′ is sorted based on the frequency of each 
bucket in descending order, (2) 𝐵𝑓, which contains full buckets, 
and (3) 𝐵𝑚, an auxiliary set that contains the buckets resulting 
from a merge. For each Bucket 𝑏𝑖 ∈ 𝐵′, the algorithm searches for 
the first Bucket 𝑏𝑗  in 𝐵𝑚 that can be merged with 𝑏𝑖, Lines 4-6. If 
it finds one, the function 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒(𝑏𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗), Line 7, creates a new 
Bucket 𝑏 to store the edges of 𝑏𝑖 and 𝑏𝑗 . The Buckets 𝑏𝑖 and 𝑏𝑗  are 
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removed from 𝐵’ and 𝐵𝑚, and the index information is updated. If 
the new bucket 𝑏 reaches its maximal capacity, 𝑏 is placed in 𝐵𝑓, 
Lines 8-9. Otherwise it is placed in 𝐵𝑚 so that it can be 
considered again for a merge, Line 11. If there is not a Bucket 
𝑏𝑗  available for a merge, 𝑏𝑖 is placed in 𝐵𝑚, Lines 15-16. Once the 
merging process has finished, dummy edges are added to the 
buckets that have not reached 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠, Lines 18-20. The edges 
inside each bucket are encrypted with 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝐾 individually. In the 
index information the labels of the nodes are encrypted with 
𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝐾, and the set of 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠 is encrypted with 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝
𝐾. 
 
Algorithm 2: Merge buckets() 
INPUT: initial bucketization  𝐵0, int: maxEdges 
OUTPUT: final bucketization:  𝐵𝑓 
1: Initialize: 𝐵′:={ 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵𝑖| b.numberOfEdges() < maxEdges}  
2: Initialize: 𝐵𝑓: =  𝐵𝑖\𝐵′; 𝐵𝑚: = {0} 
3: Order 𝐵′ by number of edges in decreasing order; 
4:  for each 𝑏𝑖 ∈  𝐵
′{ 
5:      for each 𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝐵𝑚 { 
6:          if 𝑏𝑖 fits in 𝑏𝑗  
7:              𝑏 ← merge(𝑏𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗); 
8:              if b.numberOfEdges() = maxEdges 
9:                  add b to 𝐵𝑓; 
10:             else 
11:                 add b to 𝐵𝑚; 
12:             delete 𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗; 
13:             break the loop and continue with the next 𝑏𝑖; 
14:     } 
15:         if 𝑏𝑖 does not fit in any available 𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝐵𝑚  
16:             move 𝑏𝑖 to 𝐵𝑚; 
17: } 
18: for each b in 𝐵𝑚{ 
19:     addDummyEdges(); 
20:     add b to 𝐵𝑓; 
21: } 
22:  enc(𝐵𝑓); 
 
Analysis of the Merging Phase: Because finding an optimal 
bucketization solution is computationally intractable (NP-hard), 
we introduce a heuristic to solve the problem. However, different 
heuristics are conceivable for the merging. We for our part use a 
First Fit Decreasing (FFD) approach. Garey et al. have 
demonstrated in [8] that the worst case solution for the bin 
packing problem with the FFD approach is far of the optimal by a 
factor of  
11
9
. Other approaches, such as Best Fit (BF) and Next Fit 
(NF), have a worse approximation ratio, 
17
10
 and 2 respectively [8]. 
5.6 Query Transformation  
Unlike other approaches such as [18], our bucketization approach 
does not lose any information regarding the original graph. 
Consequently, there is no limitation regarding the kind of query 
we can process in principle. However, with respect to the client 
workload, our approach is more efficient answering neighbor and 
adjacency queries than answering other queries such as finding a 
path between two given nodes. In the following, we discuss the 
processing of neighbor and adjacency queries. These queries are 
essential information needs regarding graphs [17].  
 
Algorithm 3: Neighbor Query Processing given a  
bucketization structure 𝑩 
INPUT:  𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢), key 
OUTPUT: Edges:= {} 
1: Initialize: EncBucketIDs:={}, BucketIDs:={}, EncEdges:={},   
EdgesTem :={}, Edges:={}; 
2:  encNode ←client.𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑒𝑦(𝑢); 
3:  if server.indexInformation.node=encNode 
4:      EncBucketIDs ← indexInformation.BucketIDs(encNode); 
5:   for each 𝑏𝑖in EncBucketIDs 
6:     𝑏 ←client. 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝑘𝑒𝑦(𝑏𝑖); 
7:     add 𝑏 to BucketIDs; 
8:  for each 𝑏 in BucketIDs  
9:     for each bucket in server.SetOfBuckets  
10:   if bucket.bucketID = 𝑏 
11:     eEdge ← SetOfBuckets.Edge(bucket);  
12:       add eEdge to EncEdges; 
13:   for each eEdge in EncEdges  
14:      edge ←client. 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑒𝑦
(eEdge); 
15:         add edge to EdgesTemp; 
16:  for each edge in EdgesTemp 
17:     if (edge.isFalsePositive!=true) 
18:    add edge to Edges; 
19: return Edges; 
 
Algorithm 4: Adjacency Query Processing given a  
bucketization structure B 
INPUT: 𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑘𝑒𝑦 
OUTPUT: Boolean isEdge ∈ {𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒} 
1: Initialize: Boolean isEdge = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒; 
2: encEdge ←client.𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑒𝑦(𝑢, 𝑣) 
3: if server.SetOfBuckets.Edge contains encEdge 
4:   isEdge= 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒; 
5: return isEdge; 
 
Client-side queries are transformed to server-side queries. Algo-
rithm 3 shows the transformation process for neighbor queries, 
𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟 (𝐺, 𝑢). The client starts by encrypting Node 𝑢 and 
generating the server-side query, Lines 2-3. This query retrieves 
the set of b𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠 of the encrypted node 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑒𝑦(𝑢) from the 
index information and returns it to the client, Line 4. The client 
unencrypts it and generates a new server-side query Lines 5-7. 
This new query retrieves the edges stored in buckets whose 
𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷 corresponds to one of the unencrypted b𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠, 
Lines 8-12. Finally the client unencrypts the edges and filters false 
positives, Lines 13-19. Algorithm 4 shows the procedure for 
adjacency queries, 𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣). The client starts by 
encrypting the two nodes in the query with encryption 
𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑑
𝑘𝑒𝑦(𝑢, 𝑣), Line 2. The server-side query searches in the set of 
buckets for this encrypted edge, Lines 3-4. Iff there exists such an 
edge, the nodes are adjacent. 
5.7 Our Bucketization Approach is Ind-INP 
Recall that the output of the bucketization algorithm consists of 
two parts, the index information and the set of buckets. See Figure 
5.6 where |𝐶(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)| is the length of the ciphertext representing an 
encrypted node, |𝐶(𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠)| is the length of the ciphertext 
representing the set of 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠, |𝐶(𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒)| is the length of the 
ciphertext representing an encrypted edge, |𝑁(𝑒𝑛𝑐)| is the number 
of encrypted nodes and |𝐸𝐵| is the number of buckets. In this 
section we will prove that our Bucketization Approach fulfills the 
secrecy notion Ind-INP defined in Section 4.2. To facilitate the 
proof, we first prove that our bucketization algorithm is Ind-INP 
with respect to the set of buckets output, Lemma 5.3, and with 
respect to the index information output, Lemma 5.4. 
 
 
Lemma 5.3. Given the set of buckets the Bucketization algorithm 
has generated, an adversary 𝒜 cannot distinguish whether the 
graph 𝐺 or the permuted graph 𝔭(𝐺) has been the input of the 
bucketization algorithm. 
PROOF: All buckets Index information have the same frequency, 
namely 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠. So buckets are undistinguishable. The only 
characteristic that can change in the set of buckets when the input 
of the bucketization algorithm changes is the number of buckets 
|𝐸𝐵|. |𝐸𝐵| depends on the number of nodes |𝑁| and the multiset 
of degrees of the nodes 𝑁𝐸. With knowledge K1, K2 and K3, (K2 
and K3, to be exact) an adversary has access to |𝑁| and 𝑁𝐸. 
However, since 𝔭(𝐺) is just a permutation of 𝐺, |𝑁| and 𝑁𝐸 of 
both graphs are identical. Consequently, an adversary cannot 
distinguish whether 𝐺 or 𝔭(𝐺) has been the input of the 
bucketization algorithm, given knowledge K1, K2 and K3. ∎ 
Lemma 5.4. Given the index information the Bucketization 
algorithm has generated, an adversary 𝒜 cannot distinguish 
whether the graph 𝐺 or the permuted graph 𝔭(𝐺) has been the 
input of the bucketization algorithm. 
PROOF: The only characteristic that can change in the index 
information when the input of the algorithm changes are the 
number of encrypted nodes |𝑁(𝑒𝑛𝑐)| and the length of the 
ciphertext of the set of 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠, |𝐶(𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠)|. |𝑁(𝑒𝑛𝑐)| and 
|𝐶(𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠)| depend on the number of nodes |𝑁| and the multiset 
of degrees 𝑁𝐸. With knowledge K2 and K3, an adversary has 
access to |𝑁| and 𝑁𝐸. However, the permutation does not modify 
the nodes in the graph. Also, since 𝔭(𝐺) is just the permutation of 
𝐺, 𝑁𝐸 of both graphs are identical. Consequently, an adversary 
cannot distinguish whether 𝐺 or 𝔭(𝐺) has been the input of the 
algorithm given knowledge K1, K2 and K3. ∎ 
Theorem 5.2. Our bucketization algorithm fulfills the secrecy 
notion Ind-INP (Definition 4.3).  
PROOF: The bucketization algorithm produces two outputs, the 
index information and the set of buckets. The only characteristics 
that change when the input of the algorithm changes are |𝐸𝐵|, 
|𝑁(𝑒𝑛𝑐)| and |𝐶(𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠)|. We have proven in Lemmas 5.3 and 
5.4 that the three characteristics are identical for graphs 𝐺 or 
𝔭(𝐺). Then any combination of these characteristics does not 
violate Definition 4.3. Thus, our algorithm is Ind-INP. ∎ 
6. PERFORMANCE MODEL 
We start this section by describing scale-free networks. Then we 
present our performance model which consists of (1) the Number-
of-Buckets Model and (2) the Query-Cost Model. 
A performance model is important because it allows predicting 
the behavior of an algorithm and facilitates meaningful 
comparisons or evaluations of algorithms. In our approach, the 
number of buckets obtained after applying our bucketization 
algorithm to a graph 𝐺 is a crucial parameter for query performance. 
Estimating the number of buckets is cumbersome, and we 
estimate a range. But even to estimate this range, it is necessary to 
have a model that describes relevant properties of a given graph. 
In the next section, due to the importance of scale-free networks, 
we review some of their characteristics. Based on these properties, 
we derive the so-called number-of-buckets model and the query-
cost model. 
6.1 Scale-free Networks 
Real-world networks have two important features: growth and 
preferential attachment. These features are responsible for the 
power-law distribution of scale-free networks. Many real-world 
networks, such as genetic networks or the actor network, follow a 
scale-free power-law distribution [3]. 
Growth. Real-world networks often are the result of a continuous 
growth process. At each time step, a new node is added to the 
network and connected with existing nodes. 
Preferential attachment. Nodes with higher degree will have 
higher probability to be connected to a new node. This property 
has the effect that most nodes in the network will have only few 
edges, and a few nodes gradually turn into hubs, i.e., their degree 
greatly exceeds the average. 
Barabasi et al. have introduced a model capturing the properties of 
scale-free networks, the Barabasi-Albert Model (BA) [3]. In the 
following, we review some important BA parameters. 
Degree Exponent, 𝛾. The degree exponent is the exponent of the 
power-law distribution of scale-free networks. It plays an im-
portant role in predicting many properties of these networks, e.g., 
the highest node degree. Barabasi et al. have observed that the 
degree exponent of many real networks is between 2 and 3. 
Growing parameter, 𝑚. At each time step a new node is added to 
the network with 𝑚 edges that connect it to 𝑚 existing nodes. 
Probability of a node with degree k, 𝜌𝑘. Given the degree 
exponent and the growing parameter, it is possible to calculate the 
probability that a randomly chosen node has degree of 𝑘 [3]. The 
probability is  
𝜌𝑘 =
2𝑚(𝑚+1)
𝑘(𝑘+1)(𝑘+2)
  (6.1) 
Edges. The number of edges |𝐸| in the BA is |𝐸|  = 𝑚 ∙ 𝑁, where 
𝑁 is the number of nodes. 
Largest node degree, 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥. The expected value of the largest 
node degree in the BA is 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥  ~ 𝑁
1
𝛾−1. 
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Lowest node degree, 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛. It is the minimum degree in the 
network. For 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 there is no characterization, each graph can 
have different values of 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
Based on these BA characteristic, we derive a model of the 
expected number of buckets with our bucketization algorithm.  
6.2 The Number-Of-Buckets Model NBM 
Recall that after the initialization phase of the algorithm, some 
buckets are full and some are not. Lemma 6.1 captures the number 
of buckets that have reached their maximal capacity after the 
initialization phase of the algorithm. 
Lemma 6.1. The number of full buckets after the initialization 
phase of the algorithm is  
𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini = ∑ (𝑁 ∙ 𝜌𝑘 ∙ ⌊
𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌋)
𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛
  (6.2) 
PROOF: Given a node 𝑢𝜖𝑉 in a graph 𝐺 with degree 𝑘𝑢, the 
number of full buckets generated for 𝑢 after the initialization 
phase is 𝐸𝐵𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑢 = ⌊
𝑘𝑢
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌋. 𝐸𝐵𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑢 is calculated regardless of 
the other nodes in 𝐺. Next, it is required to calculate 𝐸𝐵𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑢 for 
all nodes 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉. According to the BA properties, the probability 
that a randomly chosen node has degree of 𝑘 is given by 𝜌𝑘. Then 
the total number of nodes with degree 𝑘 is 𝑁 · 𝜌𝑘. For all the 
nodes with degree 𝑘, the total number of buckets is 𝑁 ∙ 𝜌𝑘 ∙
⌊
𝑘𝑢
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌋. Finally, to estimate the total number of buckets after 
the initialization phase, we have to consider all node degrees, 
which are between 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥. ∎ 
If we know the number of full buckets, we know the number of 
edges that have been already stored in these full buckets. Then we 
can calculate the number of edges stored in non-full buckets, see 
Lemma 6.2. 
Lemma 6.2. The number of edges that have been assigned to 
buckets that are not full is 
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵 = |𝐸|  − 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠  (6.3) 
PROOF: The number of edges already stored in full buckets after 
the initialization phase is 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠.  We subtract 
this number from the total number of edges |𝐸| to obtain 
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵.∎ 
Using these two lemmas, we introduce the range of the Bucket 
Estimation Model, see Theorem 6.1. 
Theorem 6.1. Given a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) that follows the BA 
Model, the expected number of buckets, 𝐸𝐵, is in the range:  
𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini + ⌈
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ ≤ 𝐸𝐵 ≤   
𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini +
11
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∙ ⌈
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉  (6.4) 
The lowest value of the range represents an optimal solution, and 
the highest value represents the worst case scenario of our 
bucketization algorithm. 
PROOF: The lowest value of the range is the number of buckets 
obtained with the optimal bucketization. With this optimal 
bucketization, the non-full buckets are merged so that their edges, 
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵, fill exactly ⌈
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ buckets. For the upper bound 
of the model, the worst performance ratio of the FFD approach 
used in our algorithm is 
11
9
 of the optimal solution. Consequently, 
the upper bound is the sum of the number of full buckets after the 
initialization phase, 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini, and the number of buckets after 
the merging in the worst case, i.e.,  
11
9
∙ ⌈
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉. ∎ 
Corollary 6.1 gives a range of the expected number of dummy 
edges. 
Corollary 6.1. Given a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) that follows the BA 
Model, the expected number of dummy edges, 𝐷𝐸, is in the range 
(𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini + ⌈
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉) ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 − |𝐸|  ≤ 𝐷𝐸 ≤  
 (𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini +
11
9
∙ ⌈
𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑁𝐹𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉) ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 − |𝐸|  (6.5) 
PROOF: The lower bound of the expected number of buckets from 
Theorem 6.1 multiplied with 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 yields the total number 
of edges stored in the buckets. Subtracting from this number the 
real number of edges yields the lower bound of expected dummy 
edges. The analogous argument applies for the upper bound. ∎ 
The number-of-buckets model helps us to predict the query 
performance. Depending on the type of queries, the query 
workload is divided between the client and the server, e.g., with 
neighbor queries the client has to filter false positives. Lemma 6.1 
gives the number of buckets that do not generate false positives, 
because they are full and store edges belonging to the same node. 
We obtain the percentage of buckets that produce false positives 
by comparing 𝐵𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡Full-ini to the expected number of buckets 
from Theorem 6.1. Buckets that contain false positives result in 
more work at the client. A low percentage of full buckets 
increases the average query processing effort at the client. Note 
that the number of full buckets does not only depend on the 
characteristics of the given graph, e.g., distribution of number of 
edges per node, but also on parameter 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠. As mentioned, 
adjacency queries do not require work at the client. However, 
dummy edges affect the query performance at the server. 
Preliminary experiments of ours show that more dummy edges 
increase the query execution time at the server proportionally.  
6.3 Query-Cost Model 
Given a query 𝑄, let 𝑆𝑅𝑄-𝐺 and 𝐶𝑅𝑄-𝐺  be the runtime complexity 
of 𝑄 with the original graph 𝐺, without index, at the server and 
the client respectively and 𝑆𝑃𝑄-𝐵  and 𝐶𝑃𝑄-𝐵 the run time 
complexity of 𝑄 with the bucketization structure 𝐵, without index, 
at the server and the client respectively. 
Definition 6.1: The query performance ratio of a given query 𝑄, 
an original graph 𝐺 and its corresponding bucketization structure 
𝐵 at the server side is 𝑆𝑃𝑄 = 𝑆𝑅𝑄-𝐵 𝑆𝑅𝑄-𝐺 ⁄  and the query 
performance ratio at the client side is 𝐶𝑃𝑄 = 𝐶𝑅𝑄-𝐵 𝐶𝑅𝑄-𝐺 ⁄ . 
We start by analyzing the processing of neighbor queries, 
followed by adjacency queries. We focus on the case without any 
index structure either on the original graph G or on the 
bucketization structure 𝐵. Then a single lookup in the original 
graph 𝐺 has a complexity of 𝛰(|𝐸|). In the bucketization 
structure, a single lookup in the index information has complexity 
of 𝛰(|𝑉|) and a single lookup in the set of buckets has a 
complexity of 𝛰(|𝐸| + |𝐷𝐸|), where |𝐷𝐸| is the number of 
dummy edges. 
Lemma 6.3. Let a Graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), its bucketization structure 𝐵 
and a neighbor query 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) be given. The server-side 
and the client-side performance ratio are as follows, with 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢) 
being the degree of u: 
 𝑆𝑃𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢) =
Ο(⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉∙(|𝐸|+|𝐷𝐸|))
Ο(|𝐸|)
  (6.6) 
𝐶𝑃𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢) = Ο (⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠)  (6.7) 
PROOF: In the original graph, we need to access the edges 𝐸, 
which are stored at the server, and retrieve all edges that belong to 
𝑢. Then the effort of executing a neighbor query on the server side 
is 𝑆𝑅𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢) = Ο(|𝐸|). At the client, no work is necessary. 
With our bucketization in turn, the following steps are required: 
1. Encrypt node 𝑢 for querying. The effort is Ο(1). 
2. Retrieve the set of 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠 of node 𝑢 from the index 
information. This step has a complexity of Ο(|𝑉|). Using the 
BA model, we can write |𝑉| as 
|𝐸|
𝑚
. 
3. Decrypt the set of 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷𝑠. The decryption operation has a 
complexity of Ο (⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉). 
4. For each 𝑏𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐷, one lookup in the set of buckets is 
required. The number of buckets of 𝑢 is |𝐸𝐵𝑢| = ⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉. 
The complexity of this step is Ο (⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ ∙ (|𝐸| + |𝐷𝐸|)).  
5. Decrypt and filter the ⌈
𝑘𝑢
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 edges. The 
decryption and filtering is in Ο (⌈
𝑘𝑢
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠). 
The server performs Steps 2 and 4, the client Steps 1, 3 and 5. The 
step with the highest complexity at the client is Step 5 and at the 
server it is Step 4. Consequently, the effort for executing a 
neighbor query at the server and at the client is:  
𝑆𝑅𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢)-𝐵 = Ο (⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ ∙ (|𝐸| + |𝐷𝐸|))  
𝐶𝑅𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢)-𝐵 =  Ο (⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠). 
Finally,  
𝑆𝑃𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢) =
Ο(⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉∙(|𝐸|+|𝐷𝐸|))
Ο(|𝐸|)
, 
𝐶𝑃𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢) = Ο (⌈
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑢)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
⌉ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠)  ∎ 
Lemma 6.4. Let a Graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), its bucketization structure 𝐵 
and an adjacency query 𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣) be given. The server-
side and client-side performance ratio are 𝑆𝑃𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺,𝑢,𝑣) =
Ο((|𝐸|+|𝐷𝐸|))
Ο(|𝐸|)
 and 𝐶𝑃𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢) = Ο(1). 
PROOF: In the original graph, in order to check if Edge (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸, 
it is necessary to execute one lookup on the edges 𝐸. Then the 
effort of executing an adjacency query at the server is 
𝑆𝑅𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺,𝑢,𝑣) = Ο(|𝐸|). At the client, no work is necessary. 
In the transformed graph the following steps are required: 
1. Encrypt Edge (𝑢, 𝑣) for querying. The effort is Ο(1). 
2. Execute one lookup in the encrypted edges, which are stored in 
the set of buckets. The complexity of this step is Ο(|𝐸| + |𝐷𝐸|).  
Step 1 takes place at the client, it is an encryption operation in 
Ο(1). So the ratio at the client is 𝐶𝑃𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑟(𝐺,𝑢) = Ο(1). At the 
server, the effort is 𝑆𝑅𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺,𝑢,𝑣)-𝐵 =  Ο
(|𝐸| + |𝐷𝐸|). 
Then 𝑆𝑃𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺,𝑢,𝑣) =
Ο((|𝐸|+|𝐷𝐸|))
Ο(|𝐸|)
  ∎ 
From the Query-Cost Model we can learn that for adjacency and 
neighbor queries the parameter 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 plays an important 
role in the query performance effort at client and server. If 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 increases, the number of dummy edges increases and 
the server requires more effort in order to answer queries. At the 
client-side, for answering neighbor queries if 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 
increases, the workload at the client increases too, because the 
client has to filter more false positives. 
7. EXPERIMENTS 
In this section we present experiments to evaluate (1) the accuracy 
of our number-of-buckets model and (2) the performance of our 
bucketization approach. 
7.1 Experiment Setup 
7.1.1 Input datasets 
In our experiments we use synthetic and real datasets. 
Synthetic datasets: We have used Networkx [11] to generate 8 
different undirected graphs that follow the BA Model. Table 7.1 
shows the characteristics of the data, where 𝑁 is the number of 
nodes, 𝑚 the growing parameter and 𝐸 the number of edges. 
 
Table 7.1. Characteristics of the synthetic data 
Synthetic Data N m E 
G1 5000 6 29964 
G2 5000 8 39936 
G3 10000 6 59964 
G4 10000 8 79936 
G5 40000 8 319936 
G6 40000 10 399900 
G7 150000 8 1199936 
G8 150000 10 1499900 
    
 
Real datasets: We have used as real datasets the actor network 
[14] and the Web network [16]. Barabasi et al. have proven that 
both networks are scale-free. The actor network contains 1048575 
edges and 1137725 nodes, 89150 nodes represent actors and 
1048575 nodes represent movies. An edge connects a movie with 
an actor who has played in it. The actor network exhibits the 
preferential attachment feature. This is because, if an actor has 
played in more movies, a casting director is more familiar with his 
or her skills. Then an actor with higher degree has higher chances 
to be considered for a new role. The Web network contains 
2381903 nodes and 2312497 edges, and its growing parameter 𝑚 
is 5. The nodes in the Web network are web pages, and the edges 
represent hyperlinks between them. 
7.1.2 Queries 
Based on initial experiments, we observe that node degree plays 
an important role in the query performance evaluation. Therefore, 
the nodes that will be part of the experiments sample should be 
carefully selected in order to have a representative sample of 
queries. In the context of neighbor queries, there are two kinds of 
nodes, hubs and non-hubs, with very different query performance. 
So, to have equally represented hubs and non-hubs in our query 
sample, we divide neighbor queries in two groups 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) and 𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢). For 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢), we select the input node 𝑢 randomly 
from the set of nodes 𝑉 without considering the hubs in the graph. 
For 𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢), we identify the hubs in the graph and 
use them as input. 
For adjacency queries, 𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣), the nodes 𝑢, 𝑣 were 
selected randomly from the set of nodes 𝑉. The execution time of 
adjacency queries depends on the total number of edges including 
dummy edges (Section 6.3). So a distinct consideration of hubs is 
not necessary in this case.  
7.1.3 Evaluation Measures  
We use six metrics which let us evaluate the accuracy of the NBM 
and the performance of the bucketization approach. 
The NBM metrics are: 
𝑬𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝑬𝑩: This metric quantifies the number of buckets obtained 
when applying our bucketization algorithm to Graph 𝐺. 
𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚: This is the percentage of dummy edges when applying 
our bucketization algorithm to Graph 𝐺.  
𝑬𝑩𝒖𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒕𝒔𝑭𝒖𝒍𝒍−𝒊𝒏𝒊: This is the percentage of buckets that are full after 
the initialization of the bucketization algorithm on Graph 𝐺.  
The bucketization performance metrics are: 
𝑷𝑻𝑸𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈: This metric quantifies the total query processing 
time using our bucketization structure 𝐵, i.e., it adds up the 
processing time at the client and at the server.  
𝑷𝑪𝑸𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈: This metric quantifies the client query processing 
time when using a bucketization structure, i.e., the time required 
by the client to decrypt the results returned from the server and 
filter false positives. 
𝑷𝑹𝑸𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈: This is the ratio of the total query processing time 
using a bucketization structure 𝐵 and its original graph 𝐺. 
7.2 Results 
We now present the results of the experiments. First, the evalua-
tion of the NBM is discussed, then performance. We study the 
effect of each parameter from Section 7.1.3 one by one. 
7.2.1 NBM Evaluation 
𝑬𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝑬𝑩: Figure 7.1 shows the numbers of buckets obtained with 
the synthetic data. Figure 7.2 shows the numbers of buckets 
obtained with the real datasets. For both types of datasets we have 
considered different values for Parameter 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒. The markers 
on each bar of both figures are the lower and upper bounds 
calculated with our NBM. For all experiments, the number of 
buckets obtained is always inside the range calculated with 
Theorem 6.1.  
If 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 ≤ 𝑚, the number of buckets obtained is between 
the lower bound and the middle of the range given by the NBM. If 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 > 𝑚, the number of buckets gets closer to the upper 
bound of the NBM. We explain this effect as follows: In scale-
free networks, most of the nodes in the graph have degree equal to 
𝑚. If the parameter 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒 is set to 𝑚, most buckets will have 
reached their maximal capacity after the initialization phase and 
fewer buckets will be considered for merging. Then the total 
number of buckets gets closer to the optimal solution.  
 
 
 
𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚: We calculate the percentage of dummy edges in 
comparison with the size of the original graph for the synthetic 
data and real datasets. For space constraints, Table 7.2 shows the 
average percentage of dummy edges for the synthetic data, i.e., 
eight datasets.  
Table 7.3 shows the exact percentage of dummy edges for the real 
datasets. The number of dummy edges needed increases, as 
parameter 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 takes greater values than 𝑚. More dummy 
edges means a larger database. This is likely to affect the 
efficiency of the querying process on the server as well, this will 
be examined in Section 7.2.2. 
 
Table 7.2. 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 for the synthetic datasets 
Synthetic 
Data 
1<maxEdges<m maxEdges=m maxEdges>m 
1.217% 0.889% 26.513% 
    
 
Table 7.3. 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 for the real datasets 
Actor 
network 
maxEdges=2 maxEdges=4 maxEdges=16 
0.028% 0.748% 7.629% 
Web 
network 
maxEdges=3 maxEdges=5 maxEdges=10 
0.223% 1.112% 6.349% 
 
Figure 7.1. 𝑬𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝑬𝑩 obtained for the synthetic data 
Figure 7.2. 𝑬𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝑬𝑩 obtained for the real datasets 
𝑬𝑩𝒖𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒕𝒔Full-ini: Table 7.4 shows the average percentage of full 
buckets after the initialization phase for the synthetic data. For the 
real datasets the exact percentage is given, see  
Table 7.5. The number of full buckets decreases, as parameter 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 takes greater values than 𝑚. If there are edges that 
belong to different nodes inside a bucket, then the client will have 
to do more work. Full buckets after the initialization phase contain 
edges that belong to a single node. More full buckets right after 
initialization implies fewer buckets for the merging process, fewer 
dummy edges and fewer false positives when querying. 
 
Table 7.4. 𝑬𝑩𝒖𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒕𝒔Full-ini for the synthetic datasets 
Synthetic 
Data 
1<maxEdges<m  maxEdges=m maxEdges>m 
88.79% 86.81% 46.65% 
    
 
Table 7.5. 𝑬𝑩𝒖𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒕𝒔Full-ini for the real datasets 
Actor 
network 
maxEdges=2 maxEdges=4 maxEdges=16 
59.15% 55.78% 14.49% 
Web 
network 
maxEdges=3 maxEdges=5 maxEdges=10 
81.38% 80.18% 47.96% 
 
7.2.2 Performance Evaluation 
As in the previous section, we have conducted experiments with 
synthetic and real datasets. The result analysis is the same for both 
cases. For space constraints, we only present the results on the 
real data. 
𝑷𝑻𝑸𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈: Figure 7.3(a) and (b) shows the total average query 
processing time for the three groups of queries defined in Section 
7.1.2 in the actor and Web networks. For 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) and 𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) the total 
execution time increases as 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 decreases. This is 
because, if 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒 decreases, the edges of a node will be 
distributed in more buckets, and when executing a query, more 
buckets have to be retrieved from the server. 
𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) requires greater processing time than 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢), because hubs are nodes with many 
edges. In contrast, 𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣) increases as 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 
takes higher values. The increase is due to the dummy edges 
inserted. Our experiments show that the number of dummy edges 
needed grows as 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 increases.  
𝑷𝑪𝑸𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈: For this part of the evaluation we only consider 
two groups of queries, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) and 
𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢). We omit adjacency queries because they do 
not require any post-processing. See Figure 7.3(c) and (d). The 
time at the client increases as 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 takes larger values.  
From the experiments and analysis of 𝑃𝑇𝑄𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 
𝑃𝐶𝑄𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔, we can see that the best value to set 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 is 
the growing parameter 𝑚. In scale-free networks, most nodes 
have a degree equal to 𝑚, so most buckets will be full after 
initialization. For the last experimental results, 𝑃𝑅𝑄𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔, we 
set 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 to the best option, i.e., 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 = 𝑚.  
𝑷𝑹𝑸𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈: In Figure 7.4, each two boxes of each plot show 
for each type of query executed, the total query processing time 
with our bucketization and the original graphs. The plots are for 
three kinds of queries, i.e., 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢), 
𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) and 𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣). We deem the total 
execution time on the original graph the optimum. So we evaluate 
our approach depending on how much query processing time 
increases in comparison with the original graph. Regarding the 
actor network, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) with our bucketization 
approach is on average 3.44 times slower than with the original 
graph, 𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) is 5.12 times slower and 
𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣) is 2.88 times slower. Regarding the Web 
graph, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) with our bucketization approach 
is 2.90 times slower than with the original graph on average, 
𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢) is 10.15 times slower and 
𝑄𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐺, 𝑢, 𝑣) 4.76 times. Except for 𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑄𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟(𝐺, 𝑢), 
with our approach the query execution time is 3.5 times slower 
than with the original graph. In our opinion, this is a reasonable 
price for secrecy guarantees. So our bucketization approach is 
effective and feasible for graph-structured data secrecy. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
A core challenge when outsourcing a database is to ensure the 
secrecy of the data. In this paper, we have studied this problem for 
graph-structured data. We have proposed a secrecy model for this 
kind of data based on the concept of indistinguishability. Existing 
proposals, such as [7] [23] [22], deal with different types of 
adversaries. In graph-structured data not only the node labels but 
Figure 7.4. Total query processing time real datasets 
Figure 7.3.  𝑷𝑻𝑸𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 and 𝑷𝑪𝑸𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 in the Actor and Web Networks  
also the edges of a node can reveal sensitive information. 
Therefore, our approach offers secrecy so that an adversary will 
not find out the edges and the degree of a node. While a 
bucketization of the edges gives way to the secrecy envisioned 
here, as we have shown, finding an optimal bucketization is NP-
hard. We have proposed a heuristic that guarantees that the worst 
bucketization solution will be 
11
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 off the optimal solution. Next, to 
facilitate query planning, we propose a performance model that 
allows estimating (1) the number of buckets and (2) the query 
processing complexity. Our experiments with both real and 
synthetic datasets confirm the accuracy of our model and the 
effectiveness of our approach.  
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